The Colorado Supreme Court, sitting en banc, held in Khristina Phillips v. The People of the State of Colorado that a prosecution’s pretrial appeal from a county court evidentiary ruling did not toll the state’s statutory speedy‑trial deadline because it was not a true interlocutory appeal authorized by statute. The ruling clarifies when a government appeal qualifies for tolling under Colorado’s speedy‑trial statute, § 18‑1‑405(6)(b), C.R.S. (2025).
Petitioner Khristina Phillips was convicted in county court on child abuse and related charges. The prosecution sought to appeal an evidentiary ruling to the district court, arguing the appeal paused the six‑month statutory clock. Phillips contended Colorado law did not allow tolling for that appeal because the underlying ruling was a routine evidentiary exclusion, not a suppression order for which interlocutory appeals are authorized.
Writing for the Court, Justice Monica M. Samour emphasized that not all pretrial appeals automatically pause speedy‑trial time. The Court explained that only appeals taken in good faith and with “arguable merit” under the state’s interlocutory appeal rule qualify for tolling and that evidentiary exclusions under CRE 401–403 are not “suppression” orders within the meaning of the statute. Because the prosecution’s appeal lacked arguable merit as an authorized interlocutory appeal, it did not interrupt the statutory clock.
As a result, the six‑month speedy‑trial period expired before Phillips’s trial, and the Supreme Court determined the convictions must be vacated on that basis. The decision reinforces a strict construction of prosecutorial tolling rights and underscores that routine evidentiary disputes cannot be used to delay trial beyond statutory limits.