The 10th Circuit reversed the district court in United States v. Williams (D. Colo.), ruling that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a protective sweep of a car after the driver has been arrested and handcuffed.
Case Summary:
We must decide whether the Fourth Amendment permitted a protective sweep of a car after the driver was arrested and handcuffed. Everyone agrees that the police developed reasonable suspicion that the driver was armed and dangerous. But with the arrest, any safety risks that the driver posed to the officers ended. Still, the police conducted a protective sweep of the driver’s area rather than let the passenger-owner leave it legally parked or drive it away. Within seconds of beginning the sweep, officers recovered from under the driver’s seat a loaded handgun and a magazine containing ammunition.
A federal grand jury indicted the driver for possessing ammunition after a felony conviction. In response to the driver’s motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition, the government argued that the protective sweep was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It contended that objectively reasonable officers would have suspected that the passenger, too, was armed and dangerous. To support this view, the government projected the driver’s alarming criminal history and gang ties to the passenger. It argued that prudent officers would reasonably suspect a passenger-girlfriend of a gang-associated boyfriend as a threat to access a hidden weapon from inside the car and to use it in a quixotic attempt to free him from four alert, armed officers.
The district court approved the protective sweep and denied the suppression motion. Agreeing with the government, the court ruled that the officers had reasonable suspicion that the girlfriend-passenger was armed and dangerous. It relied solely on her “romantic relationship” with the boyfriend-driver. But this amounts to a criminality-by-association test, when the governing test instead requires that we consider the totality of circumstances. The circumstances of this passenger include these: she produced a valid driver’s license, current registration, and proof of insurance for her car; she was polite, calm, and cooperative throughout the stop; and she committed no crime and was not suspected of being involved in any. We conclude that the protective search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We reverse.
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Panel: PHILLIPS, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. (Entered for the Court by Judge Phillips, with Judge Kelly entering a dissenting opinion.)
Decision: We VACATE Williams’s conviction and REMAND for further proceedings.