The Colorado Court of Appeals issued four opinions on October 29. Read the summary and entire opinion, below.
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Josias Deonicio Ortiz, Defendant-Appellant. 2026 COA 75. A division of the court of appeals considers, for the first time in a published opinion, what standard of reversal applies when a defendant is erroneously precluded from testifying as an alibi witness. The division concludes that the constitutional harmless error standard applies but that the error here wasn’t reversible.
The division further concludes that the trial court erred by misapplying the crime-fraud exception to strip the attorney-client privilege from certain communications, admitting portions of the privileged communications, and permitting the prosecution to call defendant’s former attorneys as witnesses.
The division rejects defendant’s remaining contentions and therefore affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands for a new trial on the two counts impacted by the crime-fraud exception error. Read the opinion.
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jordyn M. Williams, Defendant-Appellant. 2026 COA 76. Colorado’s 911 Good Samaritan Law, section 18-1-711, C.R.S. 2026, grants immunity from arrest and prosecution to a person who “reports in good faith an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event,” provided that certain conditions are satisfied. One such condition requires the reporting party to “identif[y]” herself to a law enforcement officer, emergency medical responder, or medical provider. § 18-1-711(1)(c). Because the defendant withheld her name from officers at the scene, the district court concluded that she failed to “identif[y]” herself and was therefore ineligible for the statute’s protection.
A division of the court of appeals disagrees. The division holds that the statute requires a good faith reporter to identify herself only as the reporting party — that is, the person who reported the overdose “to a law enforcement officer, to the 911 system, or to a medical provider,” or who aided or sought aid “for the person who suffered the emergency drug or alcohol overdose.” § 18-1-711(1)(a).
Because the defendant satisfied the statute’s requirements, she was entitled to immunity from prosecution. Accordingly, the division
vacates the defendant’s convictions and remands the case to the district court to dismiss the charges. Read the opinion.
Gerald E. McBride, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Northeastern Junior College, a Colorado public community college, and Colorado Community College System, a political subdivision of the State of Colorado, Defendants-Appellants. 2026 COA 77. This case requires a division of the court of appeals to determine whether a pathway intended for pedestrian use — located adjacent to a parking lot on a public college’s campus and also near a highway and a campus road — constitutes a “[s]idewalk,” as that term is defined in section 24-10-103(6), C.R.S. 2026, of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA).
Because the division concludes that portions of the “sidewalk” definition are ambiguous, it looks to the legislative history to assist with interpreting that provision. In doing so, it concludes that the pedestrian pathway where the plaintiff fell is not a “sidewalk” under the CGIA because (1) the General Assembly did not intend for a parking lot to be a “public roadway,” something that a “sidewalk” must be a “portion of”; and (2) the pedestrian pathway is not close in proximity to the campus road or highway for the pedestrian pathway to be a portion of those roadways.
As a result, the division concludes the district court erred by determining that the public college waived sovereign immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(d)(I), C.R.S. 2026, as the pedestrian pathway is not a “sidewalk” for purposes of the dangerous condition waiver. The division remands the case to the district court to determine whether the public college waived sovereign immunity under other CGIA provisions relied on by the plaintiff. Read the opinion.
Roger Moseley and Martha Brodzik, Relators, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Town of Palmer Lake, a municipality and municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 2026 COA 78. A division of the court of appeals determines, for the first time, that a municipality is excluded from the definition of “[p]erson” under section 24-31-1202(7), C.R.S. 2026, of the Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA). As a result, the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint against the Town of Palmer Lake because it is not a “person” subject to liability under the CFCA. Read the opinion.