The Colorado Supreme Court released three opinions on Monday, June 15. Below are the summaries of each with a link to the entire opinion.
In Re The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff v. Clemente Roberts, Defendant. 2026 CO 45. The supreme court considers whether, under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V), a defendant is entitled to have a public defender or court-appointed counsel potentially supplement the defendant’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion when the defendant’s private attorney filed the motion and subsequently withdrew from the case.
After a Crim. P. 35(c) motion passes summary review, Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) instructs the court to simultaneously (1) serve the motion on the public defender for potential supplementation, “[i]f the defendant has requested counsel,” and (2) “immediately” direct the prosecution to respond, “if the defendant already has counsel.” In this case, the supreme court determines that Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) is ambiguous because it is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations and it directs a postconviction court to two conflicting, but reasonable, courses of action-appointing and serving the motion on the public defender while also immediately directing the prosecution to respond without appointing a public
defender.
Considering the overall purpose of the criminal procedure rules under Crim. P. 2 and our case law articulating Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V)’s purpose, the supreme court concludes that the drafters’ intent is that the defendant should have counsel’s help in filing and reviewing the motion. Thus, the court holds that where a defendant’s private attorney filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, the defendant “already ha[d] counsel” under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V), meaning the defendant was not entitled to have the public defender or other court-appointed counsel supplement the motion. Accordingly, the court makes its order to show cause absolute and remands the case to the district court for an order directing the People to respond to the defendant’s motion. Read the opinion.
Mary Ann Moreno, Plaintiff v. Circle K Stores, Inc., Defendant. 2026 CO 46. The supreme court answers the following question of law certified to the court by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado:
Does Colorado law recognize a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine that allows an employee to bring a wrongful termination claim in the event the employee is terminated for actions taken in self-defense?
Applying the test established in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992), the supreme court concludes that the right to self-defense, established by section 18-1-704, C.R.S. (2025), and article II, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution, supports a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. The court determines that (1) both the statute and the constitutional provision clearly express the boundaries and extent of the right; (2) self-defense is inherently a public right, rather than an individual proprietary right; and (3) the right is work-related insofar as the need to defend oneself from an unprovoked attack can occur anywhere, including at work.
The supreme court thus answers the question in the affirmative and returns this case to the district court for further proceedings. Read the opinion.
Tiffany Kavanaugh in her official capacity as Telluride Town Clerk, Petitioner v. Telluride Locals Coalition Petitioners’ Committee; Matthew Hintermeister; Ian Wilson; Daniel Aurand; and Brighton Properties, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, Respondents. 2026 CO 47. This case requires the supreme court to consider how the citizen initiative power may be used with respect to planned unit developments (“PUDs”) under Colorado’s Planned Unit Development Act, §§ 24-67-101 to -108, C.R.S. (2025). The court has long held that the initiative power is limited to legislative acts and does not extend to administrative acts. Legislative acts are those which establish generally applicable rules based on broad policy grounds. Administrative acts, by contrast, are based on individualized, case-specific considerations, or are necessary to carry out existing legislative policies and purposes.
Applying these principles, the court concludes that the proposed initiative at issue, which sought to amend an existing PUD agreement, is administrative in character and thus is not subject to the initiative process. The court accordingly reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case to the district court for consideration of the reasonableness of the Town of Telluride’s request for attorney fees. Read the opinion.