The Colorado Supreme Court released seven opinions on Tuesday, June 23. Below is the summary with a link to the entire opinion.
The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Quinn M. Jebe, Respondent. 2026 CО 48. The supreme court granted certiorari to review whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing the People’s appeal as untimely. The People filed their appeal within forty-nine days of the district court’s order denying their motion to reconsider its judgment dismissing Quinn M. Jebe’s charges with prejudice.
The supreme court holds that when the People timely file a motion to reconsider in the district court, it tolls the appeal timeline. Hence, the supreme court concludes here that the People’s appeal was timely because they (1) filed a motion to reconsider within the forty-nine-day appeal period set forth in C.A.R. 4(b)(6)(A), which tolled the appeal timeline, and then, factoring in the time period tolled, (2) filed a notice of appeal within forty-nine days of the district court’s order denying the motion to reconsider. Accordingly, the supreme court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case for the court
of appeals to reinstate the People’s appeal as timely filed. Read the opinion.
The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Angel Adrian Castro-Velasquez, Respondent. 2026 CO 49. In this criminal case, the defendant was subject to a Crim. P. 41.1 order, which allows law enforcement officers to collect nontestimonial identification
evidence, like DNA or fingerprints, under certain circumstances that amount to less than probable cause. Rule 41.1 prevents officers from simultaneously interrogating the defendant while collecting evidence authorized by the rule.
Applying People v. Harris, 762 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1988), the supreme court holds that the execution of a Rule 41.1 order begins when the suspect is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes; that is, when a reasonable person in that situation would no longer feel free to leave. On the facts of this case, the supreme court concludes that the defendant had been seized, and the execution of the order had begun, prior to the defendant making the inculpatory statements at issue. Because the Rule 41.1 order had begun, this interrogation was improper and the inculpatory statements should have been suppressed. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. Read the opinion.
J.B., as legal guardian and personal representative of E.B., an adult with a disability, Petitioner v. MKBS, LLC d/b/a Metro Taxi, Inc. a/k/a Metro Transportation Planning and Solution Group and Jesus Manuel Ortiz, Respondents. 2026 CO 50. In this case, involving two defendants, one who defaulted and one who didn’t, the supreme court holds that the district court didn’t abuse its discretion
by allowing the defaulting defendant to testify at the non-defaulting defendant’s trial even though his testimony contradicted the facts admitted by his default. The supreme court also concludes that the district court reasonably applied the three-factor test from Goodman Assocs., LLC v. WP Mountain Props., LLC, 222 P.3d 310, 319 (Colo. 2010), in determining whether to set aside the default judgment and that the defaulting defendant had established excusable neglect.
Finally, the supreme court concludes that the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by entering judgment in favor of the defendant whose default judgment had been set aside because doing so avoided the entry of inconsistent judgments. The court therefore affirms the judgment of the court of appeals. Read the opinion.
Jason P. Brown, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent. 2026 CO 51. In this case, the supreme court granted certiorari to consider (1) whether
People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006), is no longer good law or is distinguishable, and whether the trial court reversibly erred and violated the defendant’s right to due process because it allowed the jury to convict him of a class 3 felony for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death (“LTS (death)”) without the prosecution proving that he acted with any culpable mental state; and (2) whether Colorado’s prior habitual offender scheme is unconstitutional because it required a judge rather than a jury to make findings of fact that increase a defendant’s sentence, and whether the defendant’s adjudication as a habitual offender must be vacated because he was deprived of his right to a jury trial.
The court now concludes that (1) Manzo remains good law, and therefore, the trial court did not err or violate the defendant’s right to due process in entering judgment for LTS (death) and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious bodily injury against him without requiring the prosecution to prove that he acted with any culpable mental state; and (2) the prior Colorado habitual offender scheme was constitutional, and any error in the defendant’s adjudication as a habitual offender was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court affirms the division’s judgment. Read the opinion.
Veolia Water Technologies, Inc., Petitioner v. Antero Treatment LLC, Antero Resources Corporation, Antero Midstream Partners LP, and Antero Midstream Corporation, Respondents. 2026 CO 52. In this case concerning a dispute that followed a series of contracts between two commercial entities, the supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether the economic loss rule bars a fraud claim when the parties were in a contractual relationship, the fraud claim allegedly sought the same relief as a breach of
contract claim, and the fraud allegedly concerned a party’s performance under the contract.
The court now concludes that because (1) the interrelated contracts doctrine does not apply to a series of contracts between two parties when each contract represents a stand-alone transaction and (2) the fraud alleged here occurred prior to the formation of the pertinent contract and, on the facts presented, induced the other party to sign that contract, the economic loss rule does not bar the fraud claim in this case.
Accordingly, the court affirms the court of appeals division’s decision below, albeit on other grounds, and remands this case with instructions to return the case to the trial court for a determination of the reasonable attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party under the pertinent contract’s fee-shifting provision. Read the opinion.
The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Donald Louis Gerle, Respondent. 2026 CO 53. The supreme court reviews a decision of a division of the court of appeals, which reversed the defendant’s judgment of conviction based on the trial court’s exclusion of evidence regarding certain text messages between the defendant and the victim. The supreme court concludes that evidence regarding the text messages – which reflected the defendant’s and the victim’s fantasies concerning a consensual sexual bondage, discipline, dominance, submission, sadism, and masochism (“BDSM”) encounter- was inadmissible under C.R.E. 401 and C.R.E. 402 given the specific facts of this case.
While a prior act may be relevant to charged conduct, the prior act at issue in this specific case involved a consensual BDSM encounter that was explicitly sexual in nature. No evidence indicated that the defendant and the victim planned or were otherwise engaged in a consensual sexual BDSM encounter during the four-day incident which led to the defendant being charged with first and second degree assault and false imprisonment. Because of the dissimilarity between the text messages and the charged conduct, the messages do not make it more probable that the victim consented to being confined or less probable that the defendant intended to confine and assault the victim. Thus, the text messages were inadmissible. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. Read the opinion.
In Re Arrowhead, Petitioner v. Roxborough Park Foundation, et al., Respondents. 2026 CO 54. In this original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, the supreme court concludes
that the trial court erred in finding it lacked discretion to order prehearing discovery in condemnation proceedings. Instead, the supreme court holds that C.R.C.P. 26(d) and 26(b)(2) grant trial courts the discretion to order discovery, while C.R.C.P. 16(b)(1) grants trial courts the authority to deem a case “at issue” which then enables the court to authorize discovery. Accordingly, the supreme court makes the order to show cause absolute and remands the case to the trial court to determine, in its discretion, whether to grant or deny the Foundation’s request for prehearing discovery. Read the opinion.