The Colorado Court of Appeals released five opinions today. Below are the summaries of each with a link to the entire opinion.
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter Cichuniec, Defendant-Appellant. 2026 COA 43. A division of the court of appeals holds that, to convict a person of an offense as a complicitor, the prosecution must prove that another person committed the statutory elements of the offense but does not have to disprove any affirmative defense that the principal would be entitled to raise. The division also holds that, under section 18-1-605, C.R.S. 2025, acquittal of the principal on a charge does not require acquittal of a complicitor as to that same charge. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded with directions. Read the opinion.
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeremy Cooper, Defendant-Appellant. 2026COA44. A division of the court of appeals holds that the special prosecutor statute, section 16-5-209, C.R.S. 2025, is not the exclusive means for prosecuting an individual when the elected district attorney has declined to prosecute. The Attorney General may also prosecute an individual pursuant to an executive order issued by the Governor under section 24-31-101(1), C.R.S. 2025, consistent with the Colorado Constitution.
The division also holds that, under section 18-3-105, C.R.S. 2025, which defines the offense of criminally negligent homicide, and under section 18-1-501(3), C.R.S. 2025, which defines criminal negligence, the standard of care applicable to the defendant’s conduct is that of a reasonable person in the actor’s situation under all the circumstances known to the actor. That standard must — in a case like this — be one that would apply to an emergency medical professional treating a person in the patient’s condition. Judgment reversed and case remanded with directions. Read the opinion.
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard James Coulier II, Defendant-Appellant. 2026COA45. In this criminal impersonation of a peace officer case, and as a matter of first impression, a division of the Court of Appeals interprets the phrase “an act” in the statutory element “perform[ed] an act in that pretended capacity.” § 18-8-112(1), C.R.S. 2025. The division holds that “an act” may constitute any conduct that is done while in that pretended capacity and that this interpretation is consistent with federal case law requiring a defendant to engage in conduct that is more than mere bravado, puffery, or bragging. The division further concludes that sufficient evidence of the defendant’s conduct constituting “an act” supported his conviction, and thus, the judgment is affirmed. Read the opinion.
Vicki Reno, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie Henderson, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. d/b/a Sharmar Village Care Center, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. 2026COA46. A division of the court of appeals holds that a medical durable power of attorney (MDPOA) does not confer authority on the agent to enter into an arbitration agreement on behalf of her principal unless the MDPOA expressly grants that authority. Applying this holding, the division affirms the district court’s denial of a health care facility’s motion to compel arbitration. Order affirmed. Read the opinion.
The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of C.N.T., a Child, and Concerning W.C.T. and N.L.D., Appellants. 2026COA47. In this dependency and neglect appeal, a division of the court of appeals considers whether a guardian ad litem (GAL) has standing to file a motion to terminate parental rights. The division concludes that a GAL has standing because (1) People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, applies only to the first, or adjudicatory, phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding and not to the second, or dispositional, phase of a dependency or neglect proceeding; and (2) the GAL is acting under their independent statutory charge to advocate for the child’s best interests. The division further rejects the parents’ contentions that the juvenile court erred by (1) terminating their parental rights; (2) finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them and to reunite them with the child; (3) finding that the father was unfit and that the mother couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time; and (4) finding there was no less drastic alternative to termination.
Likewise, the division is unpersuaded by the father’s additional claims that (1) his treatment plan was inappropriate; (2) he substantially complied with his treatment plan; and (3) his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The division affirms the juvenile court’s judgment. Read the opinion.