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In Re: People v. Beverly
In 2016, fentanyl surpassed heroin as the drug responsible for the most opioid-related deaths nationwide. By 2021, fentanyl — which is roughly 50 times more potent than heroin — accounted for two-thirds of drug overdose deaths in the U.S. That year, roughly half of the overdose deaths in Colorado were related to this synthetic opioid. In 2022, the General Assembly responded to these trends by enacting House Bill 22-1326. Among other things, this bill enhanced the penalties for those convicted of distributing drugs where the offense is “the proximate cause of the death of another person who used or consumed” the substance.
Under the provisions of HB22-1326, defendants charged with fentanyl distribution under these circumstances face sentences that are four times longer than the ordinary presumptive range for fentanyl distribution offenses.
In this original proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court was asked to determine whether evidence of a drug purchaser’s suicidal intent may be relevant to determining whether a defendant’s distribution of fentanyl was the “proximate cause” of the drug purchaser’s death under Section 18-18-405(2)(a)(III)(A) of the new law.
Patrick Beverly II sold pills containing fentanyl to Matthew Bowen, who died after consuming them. A coroner later determined that Bowen had died by suicide. Prosecutors charged Beverly with distribution of less than 4 grams of fentanyl where the distribution was “the proximate cause” of Bowen’s death.
Anticipating that Beverly would seek to introduce evidence of Bowen’s suicidal intent as a defense to the law’s enhanced penalties, prosecutors filed a motion in limine to exclude such evidence. The trial court denied the motion.
Prosecutors then sought relief in the Colorado Supreme Court, contending that the trial court erred by concluding that evidence of a drug purchaser’s suicide may be relevant to the law’s proximate-cause requirement. The state Supreme Court granted the petition and issued an order to show cause.
The court noted it discharged the order for two reasons. First, it concluded that the plain language of Section 18-18-405(2)(a)(III)(A) doesn’t preclude a court from admitting evidence of a purchaser’s suicidal intent in taking fentanyl. The General Assembly’s use of the specific phrase “proximate cause” invokes the well-established legal definition of that term under People v. Rockwell. Under that definition, conduct that might otherwise constitute a legal or “proximate” cause of a person’s death is not a proximate cause when an “intervening cause” instead causes the death. An intervening cause is an event in which the defendant doesn’t participate, that is not reasonably foreseeable, and but for which the person’s death would not have occurred.
The state Supreme Court concluded that a drug purchaser’s suicide by intentional overdose may constitute an intervening cause that precludes the defendant’s act of distributing fentanyl from being the proximate cause of a purchaser’s fentanyl-related death. Because suicide by intentional overdose may serve as an intervening cause, and because any factual disputes regarding proximate cause are best left for the jury to decide, the court held that evidence of a purchaser’s suicidal intent may be relevant for the purpose of applying Section 18-18-405(2)(a)(III)(A)’s proximate-cause requirement.
Second, under the facts of this case, the state Supreme Court concluded that the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion when it denied prosecutors’ motion to exclude evidence of Bowen’s suicidal intent either as irrelevant under evidentiary Rule 402 or as unduly likely to confuse the jury under Rule 403.