Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
Theodore Madrid was charged in 2011 with one count of first-degree murder and two counts of child abuse resulting in death. Madrid was tried in 2012 and during jury selection, the prosecution excused a prospective juror, J.T., a Black man.
Both sides were allowed to question the prospective jurors, including J.T. who gave short answers to many of the questions. Prosecutors used a peremptory challenge to excuse J.T. Madrid raised a Batson challenge arguing J.T. ‘s questionnaire indicated he was fact neutral.
The prosecution argued J.T. would be replaced by another Black juror and they didn’t believe the defense can claim that the strike wasn’t race-neutral. The prosecution argued they had very little information on J.T. and didn’t have time for a detailed conversation with him.
The trial court confirmed the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons and excused J.T.
The court also volunteered its own assessment of J.T. that it seemed he didn’t want to be there. The court also emphasized J.T. was replaced by another Black juror, the defendant was Hispanic and race wasn’t an issue in the underlying case. The trial court also found the defense failed to make a prima facie claim showing that the prosecution excluded J.T. because of his race and the facts didn’t give rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination, the first step of Batson. The trial court contended because the defense failed in step one, the challenge failed. Madrid was eventually convicted on all counts.
Madrid appealed and a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals determined the trial court erred in finding Madrid failed to meet the step-one burden establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The appeals court rejected some of the trial court’s reasoning, including the court’s reliance on its observation that a Black juror replaced J.T. and Madrid was Hispanic rather than Black, explaining prior case law rendered those facts irrelevant.
The appeals court found the trial court improperly relied on the prosecution’s arguments that it had minimal time to question J.T. and J.T. ‘s questionnaire didn’t have a lot of detail, arguing other potential jurors with similar circumstances were seated. The appeals court accepted the trial court’s assertion it stopped its analysis before step two of Batson and the case was remanded to trial court.
In 2017, the district court began remand proceedings to complete the fact-finding for Batson’s second and third steps. At the beginning, Madrid objected to the prosecution offering race-neutral justification that wasn’t stated during the 2012 trial. The district court overruled the objection because the remand order from the appeals court, instructed it to take additional evidence and allow more argument at the request of either party. This was because the previous ruling hadn’t been extended beyond the first step of Batson.
The district court determined the prosecution met its step-two burden to provide race-neutral reasons for striking J.T. In the third step of the analysis, the court rejected Madrid’s claims that the prosecutors explanations were pretextual and concluded Madrid failed to meet his burden to prove the prosecution engaged in purposeful discrimination.
Madrid appealed again and another division of the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed.
The appeals court held when the prosecution articulated its race-neutral reason for striking a potential juror during a Batson proceeding at trial, a district court cannot consider or base its ruling on new justifications on remand. The appeals court reversed Madrid’s judgment and remanded for a new trial.
The prosecution petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for en banc review that it granted.
The majority of the high court held a party on remand cannot raise a new race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory strike made a trial. The high court held that when a party is provided with an opportunity to present its race-neutral justifications at trial, it’s barred from introducing new ones on remand. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ more recent judgment, meaning Madrid is entitled to a new trial.
Chief Justice Brian Boatright dissented, arguing the majority erred by stepping outside the Batson framework by instead opting to import the de novo standard of review from other contexts.
Antero Resources Corporation v. Airport Land Partners, Ltd. et al
This case comes out of disputes between Antero Resources Corporation and nine royalty owners over whether Antero can deduct certain post-production costs from royalty payments under the applicable leases’ royalty clauses.
The royalty owners alleged Antero underpaid royalties in violation of their lease contracts. The different lease agreements addressed the deduction of costs in three different ways.
The royalty owners filed individual breach of contract suits against Antero between December 2016 and April 2017. Antero moved to dismiss the suits, arguing the claims should have been brought to the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission in the first instance. A district court granted Antero’s motions, finding the royalty owners could sue in district court only after exhausting administrative remedies by giving the COGCC an opportunity to determine that it didn’t have jurisdiction. The court further concluded in each case, the lease at issue was unambiguous and didn’t require interpretation by COGCC.
After dismissal, the royalty owners brought their claims before COGCC, asking it to determine if it had jurisdiction. COGCC determined it didn’t, basing the decision on Colorado Revised Statute 34-60-118.5(5) that provides COGCC doesn’t have jurisdiction to determine the amount of proceeds due to a payee by a payer if that determination involved resolving a bona fide dispute over the interpretation of a contract for payment. COGCC determined each of the royalty owners’ claims raised a bona fide dispute regarding how the lease contract should be interpreted.
Antero was granted judicial review of COGCC’s determination in district court. The court determined COGCC had jurisdiction because the contracts at issue were unambiguous and the disputes only required factual determinations.
The royalty owners appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals that reversed the district court, holding the COGCC reasonably concluded it lacked jurisdiction under 34-60-118.5(5). The appeals court disagreed with the district court’s finding that the leases at issue didn’t require legal interpretation. The appeals court concluded that because the parties disagreed over the extent of the royalty owners’ legal entitlement to further payments under the leases, COGCC was correct to find it didn’t have jurisdiction.
Antero petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review which was granted.
A majority of the en banc high court held statute prevents COGCC from having jurisdiction to resolve bona fide disputes of contract interpretation. It held those disputes exist when parties disagree about the meaning or application of a relevant contract term. The Colorado Supreme Court further concluded each contract conflict was a bona fide dispute because the parties had a good faith disagreement over the meaning of contract terms. The high court affirmed the appeals court’s decision.
Justice Carlos Samour was joined by Justices William Hood and Maria Berkenkotter in dissent, arguing they don’t believe the opinion adheres to the plain language of statute.