People v. Sauser
Ian Sauser appealed his conviction of two counts of menacing and one count of aggravated robbery. Sauser’s six appellate arguments include two issues of first impression in Colorado — whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying a defendant’s last-minute request for a continuance to search for evidence that may not exist; and whether a trial court may allow a prosecutor, in the presence of the jury, to ask a defendant a question on cross-examination, unrelated to any topic addressed during direct examination, that the trial court and the prosecutor know the defendant will respond to by invoking the right against self-incrimination.
A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sauser’s motion for continuance, determined that allowing the prosecutor’s question, while improper, constituted harmless error and disagreed with Sauser’s other contentions of error. The division affirmed.
People v. Hayes
Andrew Hayes appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. His only contention on appeal was that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress physical evidence found on his person during a booking search following a traffic stop.
As a matter of first impression, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals held that section 42-3-203(3)(d)(I), of the 2020 Colorado Revised Statutes read in conjunction with section 42-3-202 requires affixing a vehicle’s temporary plate in the same location as a permanent rear license plate. Because the car in which Hayes was riding did not have a temporary plate in the required location, the officer who stopped the car had reasonable suspicion to make and continue the stop. That holding required the court to also reject Hayes’s Fourth Amendment challenge and affirm his convictions.
Redden v. Clear Creek Skiing Corporation
After an experienced Colorado skier was injured while attempting to exit a ski lift, Clear Creek Skiing Corporation was sued for the alleged negligence of a Loveland Ski Area employee who was operating the lift Clear Creek owned.
In this case, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals addressed whether ski area operators can, by using exculpatory agreements, protect themselves from personal injury lawsuits arising from the alleged negligence of their employees. Because it determined operators may protect themselves in this manner, it affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Clear Creek. This case is discussed in detail on page 12.
Owens v. Williams
Nathanael Owens is an inmate serving a lengthy sentence in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections arising from convictions for three offenses. He sued employees of the DOC under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) seeking a writ of mandamus, claiming that the DOC has improperly calculated his parole eligibility date. The DOC moved to dismiss, and the district court granted its motion.
Ultimately, this case turns on whether the DOC can rely on section 17-22.5-403(2.5) of the 2020 Colorado Revised Statutes, to calculate Owens’ parole eligibility date as the date he will have served 75% of his entire composite sentence. Owens contended that because he wasn’t convicted of a crime of violence, that provision doesn’t apply. The provision that Owens said does apply is section 17-22.5-403(1), which sets forth the general rule that an inmate is eligible for parole after serving 50% of their sentence.
A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded the DOC doesn’t have a clear duty to calculate Owens’ parole eligibility date in the way Owens requests. While the division agreed with Owens that his consecutive sentences for his offenses must be treated as one continuous sentence for the purpose of calculating his parole eligibility date, because he was convicted of two class 3 felony counts of aggravated robbery, the DOC could apply the 75% multiplier of section 17-22.5-403(2.5)(b)(I) when determining the parole eligibility date for the one continuous sentence, notwithstanding the fact that Owens is also serving a sentence for an offense that doesn’t fall within section 17-22.5-403(2.5). The division affirmed.
Tuscany Custom Homes, LLC v. Westover
This appeal concerned the scope and application of the statutory protection for mediation communications, which renders a mediation communication generally inadmissible in a judicial proceeding.
Distinguishing Yaekle v. Andrews, in part, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded this protection applies to a mediation communication as well as to evidence that discloses information concerning a mediation communication — such as an unsigned, post-mediation writing offered to prove the existence and terms of an oral agreement reached during a mediation proceeding.
Because such an unsigned writing is inadmissible, a party cannot prove the existence or terms of an agreement reached at mediation unless it is reduced to writing and fully executed or the party can present other, admissible evidence of the agreement. Because the district court here erroneously relied on evidence that disclosed mediation communications when the court found that the parties created an oral settlement agreement during a mediation proceeding, the division reversed the court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.