Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
People v. Ashley Hernandez
Prosecutors initially charged Ashley Hernandez with one count of retaliation against a judge — harassment, based on statements she made to a judge while the two were riding in a courthouse elevator.
Hernandez moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that her statements were protected speech under the First Amendment. Prosecutors amended the complaint to charge one count of retaliation against a judge — credible threat. Prosecutors also responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing that Hernandez’s statements constituted true threats of violence and, therefore, were not protected by the First Amendment.
The district court sided with Hernandez and dismissed the charge on First Amendment grounds. In a written order, the court noted that an audio recording of the incident had been entered into the record during a pretrial motions hearing.
Having reviewed that recording, the court acknowledged that Hernandez’s language might have been disrespectful and the judge may have felt threatened. However, the court found that no threats of violence were uttered. Citing Counterman v. Colorado, the court reasoned that there was no evidence that Hernandez recklessly disregarded the threatening nature of her words. It dismissed the charge because it concluded that Hernandez’s statements were protected speech and the charge against her was unconstitutional as applied.
Prosecutors appealed the district court’s order dismissing a single-count complaint and information against Hernandez.
The Colorado Supreme Court didn’t reach the merits of the district court’s ruling. Instead, it concluded as a threshold jurisdictional matter that, because the district court’s order dismissed Hernandez’s criminal count on as-applied constitutional grounds, this case should have been appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
The state’s high court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals.
People in interest of J.D.
In this original proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the Department of Human Services had the authority to reevaluate the competency of J.D., a juvenile defendant.
J.D. argues that the juvenile court shouldn’t have accepted and relied upon the department’s restoration evaluation because the department lacked the authority to complete such an evaluation absent a court order.
Prosecutors and the district court argue that evaluating competency is part of providing restoration services and a separate court order to conduct such an evaluation is unnecessary.
The state Supreme Court agreed with prosecutors and the district court. Section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) of state law expressly designates the department as “the entity responsible for the oversight of restoration education and coordination of services necessary to competency restoration.” Applying the plain language of the statute, the court held that restoration evaluations are included in “services necessary to competency restoration.”
So the department may conduct such evaluations without a court order. And because the department’s restoration evaluation was proper, the state’s high court discharged the order to show cause.
Garcia v. Centura Health Corporation
Jina Garcia received treatment from St. Anthony North Hospital, which is operated and controlled by Centura, as a result of injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. When Garcia was admitted to the hospital, she informed personnel there that she had both Medicare and Medicaid coverage and that her automobile insurance carrier was Progressive Insurance.
After determining that Garcia’s injuries were the result of the wrongful acts of another or others, Centura asserted a hospital lien against Garcia in the amount of $2,170.35, reflecting the amount of medical services and treatment rendered at St. Anthony North Hospital as a result of the accident in which Garcia had been involved. It appears undisputed that Centura didn’t bill Medicare prior to asserting this lien.
Garcia, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, filed a putative class action lawsuit against Centura, alleging that Centura had violated the law by filing its lien against Garcia and the other class members before billing Medicare. Pursuant to the statute, Garcia sought damages of twice the amount of the asserted lien. The district court subsequently certified a class consisting of “[a]ll Colorado residents who had Medicare as their primary medical insurance at the time [Centura] provided them with services for injuries resulting from the negligence or other wrongful acts of another person and against whom [Centura] asserted a hospital lien without first billing Medicare.”
This case came before the Colorado Supreme Court a second time. After the district court ordered that Garcia respond to substantial discovery requests propounded by Centura Health Corporation, the court granted and made a rule to show cause absolute.
In its order, the state Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions that the district court determine and make specific findings regarding whether the discovery sought by Centura was relevant to the claims and defenses in this case, expressly directing the district court to keep in mind that this lawsuit involves wrongful lien claims for which statutory damages are established by law.
On remand, the district court again ordered that Garcia respond to substantial discovery requests propounded by Centura, prompting Garcia to seek further relief. In her petition, she argued that the district court violated the state Supreme Court’s prior mandate and abused its discretion in ordering the discovery at issue.
The state Supreme Court issued an order to show cause.
The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the discovery at issue and Garcia is not required to respond to those discovery requests. In light of this determination, the court found it need not address Garcia’s contention that the district court did not comply with the remand order.
Accordingly, the court made the order to show cause absolute, and remanded this case to the district court.
People v. Furness
Late on the night of Aug. 26, 2022, an Arapahoe County sheriff’s deputy was driving through Centennial, Colorado, on a routine patrol when he heard four gunshots. He headed toward the sound of the gunshots and found several people standing in front of the Green Tree Hotel who reported hearing multiple gunshots come from behind the hotel.
A second officer arrived on the scene and contacted two men who were standing in the parking lot behind the hotel near a dark-colored Lexus sedan. One of the men, who was later identified as Furness, was standing near the trunk of the vehicle. The other man was Furness’s friend, V.M. Furness indicated that he had seen a white male in the grass-covered area across from the parking lot shoot a gun once and leave on foot.
Furness stated that he was looking for his car keys, and one of the deputies commented that the Lexus’s front passenger-side car window was open. Furness responded to this observation by repeatedly saying there was no gun in the car. Upon further inspection, the deputy noticed that the driver-side car window was also completely rolled down. Throughout his interaction with Furness and V.M., V.M. repeatedly volunteered that he and Furness had been drinking alcohol. Furness later confirmed that he was at the hotel to get drunk with his friend.
The officers did not find any shell casings in the grass-covered area Furness identified, although they did find car keys there. A third officer used the key fob to confirm that the keys were paired with the Lexus and, after Furness acknowledged that the Lexus was his car, the officer returned the keys to him.
After Furness’s keys were returned, an officer looked through the Lexus’s windows with his flashlight and saw what appeared to be a gun case on the backseat and an empty bottle of Fireball whiskey on the driver’s seat.
When the officer looked into the vehicle with his flashlight, the windows of the car were rolled up. The officer then obtained Furness’s name, ran it through the computer system, and determined that Furness had a protection order prohibiting him from, among other things, possessing or consuming alcohol or controlled substances. The police arrested Furness for violation of the protection order based on his admitted consumption of alcohol.
Meanwhile, a fourth officer was speaking with a witness at the Quality Hotel next door. The witness identified the shooter as a Black male wearing a black shirt in a dark Mercedes or Lexus with tinted windows.
Additionally, the witness said the shooter’s first name was “Sheron.” The witness’s description matched Furness’s first name, physical appearance, his vehicle’s appearance and Furness’s and the vehicle’s location. The witness subsequently participated in a show-up identification and positively identified Furness as the shooter.
After the witness identified Furness as the shooter, one of the deputies determined that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of the shooting and the protection order violations. Upon opening the driver’s door, he found two bags that were later determined to contain 12.9 grams of cocaine and 0.8 grams of methamphetamine. He then opened the gun case in the backseat, which contained an empty magazine.
Next, he searched the trunk of the vehicle, where he found a Taurus 9-millimeter handgun, ammunition for the handgun, five $20 bills and a scale with white powder residue on it. The officer examined the handgun and noted that it had 11 out of 15 rounds in the magazine, with one round in the chamber, and that the gun’s hammer was cocked back.
Furness was charged with possession with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, special offender, prohibited use of a weapon, disorderly conduct, violation of a protection order and controlled substance-special offender-deadly weapon.
Furness moved to suppress all the evidence found in the trunk, arguing that law enforcement lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk.
Prosecutors brought this interlocutory appeal challenging an order of the Arapahoe County District Court suppressing all evidence found in the trunk of Sheron Mario Furness’s vehicle during a warrantless search. The district court determined that the officers who searched the trunk of Furness’s car didn’t have probable cause to do so.
Because it concluded the officers reasonably believed, under the totality of the circumstances, that the trunk would contain evidence of a crime, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.