In re Marriage of Hogsett & Neale
In this case, In re Estate of Yudkin and In re Marriage of LaFleur & Pyfer, the Colorado Supreme Court revisited the test for proving a common law marriage that was articulated in People v. Lucero.
In the Lucero test, evidence of a marriage agreement and conduct could be found in a couple’s cohabitation; reputation in the community as husband and wife; maintenance of joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint ownership of property; filing of joint tax returns; and use of the man’s surname by the woman or by children born to the parties.
Hogsett, Yudkin and LaFleur together illustrate how much has changed since Lucero. Same-sex couples may now lawfully marry, though their right to do so was not recognized in Colorado until October 2014. Yet the gender-differentiated terms and heteronormative assumptions of the Lucero test render it ill-suited for same-sex couples. At the same time, genuine marital relationships no longer necessarily bear Lucero’s markers. The lower court decisions in these cases reflect the challenges of applying Lucero to these changed circumstances.
The Supreme Court refined the test and held that a common law marriage may be established by the mutual consent or agreement of the couple to enter the legal and social institution of marriage, followed by conduct manifesting that mutual agreement. The core inquiry is whether the parties intended to enter a marital relationship — that is, to share a life together as spouses in a committed, intimate relationship of mutual support and obligation.
Here, the Supreme Court applied the refined Lucero test and concluded that no common law marriage existed. The court therefore affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In re Estate of Yudkin
The Colorado Supreme Court applied the updated common law marriage test announced in In re Marriage of Hogsett & Neale, emphasizing that a common law marriage finding depends on the totality of the circumstances, and no single factor is dispositive.
When Viacheslav Yudkin died intestate, his ex-wife, Svetlana Shtutman, was appointed personal representative of his estate. Tatsiana Dareuskaya sought Shtutman’s removal, asserting that she should have had priority for that appointment as Yudkin’s common law wife. A probate court magistrate found that although Yudkin and Dareuskaya cohabitated and held themselves out to their community as married, other factors weighed against a finding of common law marriage, including that the couple did not file joint tax returns, own joint property or accounts, or share a last name. The Court of Appeals reversed the magistrate’s order, concluding the magistrate abused his discretion by misapplying the test for a common law marriage set out in Lucero.
The Supreme Court determined in Yudkin that it is unclear from the record whether the parties mutually agreed to enter into a marital relationship. Moreover, the court noted that while the magistrate’s treatment of certain evidence may have been appropriate under Lucero, it does not account for the legal and social changes to marriage acknowledged in Hogsett. The court therefore vacated the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions to return the case to the probate court to reconsider whether the parties entered into a common law marriage under the refined Lucero test.
In re Marriage of LaFleur & Pyfer
In January 2018, Timothy Pyfer filed a dissolution of marriage petition, alleging that he and his same-sex partner, Dean LaFleur, had entered into a common law marriage on Nov. 30, 2003, when they held a ceremony. But LaFleur argued that, as a matter of law, the couple could not have entered into a common law marriage because “same sex marriages were not recognized or protected under Colorado law” at that time. LaFleur further argued that, as a matter of fact, he and Pyfer did not mutually agree to enter into a common law marriage, as required under the test articulated in Lucero.
The Supreme Court held that state law restrictions on same-sex marriage deemed unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, cannot serve as an impediment to the recognition of a same-sex marriage predating that decision. The court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the parties here were not, as a matter of law, barred from entering into a common law marriage. The court also affirmed the district court’s determination that the parties in fact entered into a common law marriage in 2003. However, the court reversed the district court’s division of property and award of spousal maintenance, and remanded with instructions to make further findings in accordance with sections 14-10-113 and -114, of the 2020 Colorado Revised Statutes.
Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., LLC
This case requires the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether, after a district court enters an order dismissing an action pursuant to C.R.C.P.12(b)(1), C.R.C.P.15(a) gives the plaintiff the right to amend its complaint as a matter of course and without leave of the court or the consent of the defendant, or whether such a dismissal results in a final judgment that cuts off the plaintiff’s right to amend as a matter of course.
DIA Brewing Co.,LLC contended that, after the district court entered an order dismissing this action pursuant to C.R.C.P.12(b)(1),C.R.C.P.15(a), it gave DIA Brewing the right to amend its complaint as a matter of course and without leave of the court or the consent of defendants because no responsive pleading had been filed. MCE-DIA, LLC and Richard Schaden, in contrast, contend that the C.R.C.P.12(b)(1) dismissal resulted in a final judgment that cut off DIA Brewing’s right to amend as a matter of course under C.R.C.P.15(a). Thus, MCE-DIA contends that if DIA Brewing wanted to amend, it was required to seek leave of the court or to obtain MCE-DIA’s written consent.
Reading C.R.C.P.15(a) harmoniously with C.R.C.P.59 and C.R.C.P.60, the Supreme Court concluded that a final judgment cuts off a plaintiff’s right to file an amended complaint as a matter of course under C.R.C.P.15(a). Accordingly, because the dismissal order at issue constituted a final judgment, DIA Brewing did not have the right to amend its complaint as a matter of course but rather was obligated, if it wished to amend, to seek relief from the judgment and to file a motion requesting leave to amend or indicating that MCE-DIA had consented in writing to the filing of an amended complaint.
Nonetheless, in the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court deems it appropriate to consider the viability of the amended complaint and now concludes, contrary to the district court, that that amended pleading is not futile but rather states viable claims for relief. Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the division below, albeit on different grounds, and remanded this case with directions that the case be returned to the district court with instructions that the court accept DIA Brewing’s amended complaint for filing, after which MCE-DIA may respond in the ordinary course.