Kerner v. City and County of Denver
This appeal arises out of a class action lawsuit brought by Marian Kerner and Ramona Lopez, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against the City and County of Denver.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Denver’s use of a specific type of pre-employment screening test had a disparate impact on minority applicants. After five years of litigation culminating in a bench trial, the district court agreed with plaintiffs.
The amount of damages was a hotly contested issue with plaintiffs initially seeking $18 million in damages. After considering the trial record and post-trial supplemental briefing on damages, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and awarded them $1,674,807 in damages.
Because they were the prevailing party, plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney’s fees and expenses. They sought $1,550,195 in attorney’s fees and $162,120.99 in expenses (the bulk of which were expert fees). Denver objected to plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that both the hourly rates and the number of hours for plaintiffs’ counsel should be reduced.
It created a table reflecting a proposed reduction in rates and hours that, when calculated out, would lead to a total award of $894,443 for attorney’s fees. Denver did not contest the $140,358.00 in expenses plaintiffs sought for their main expert, but it did object to the expenses for two other experts.
The district court declined to award plaintiffs the full amount of fees and expenses they had requested; instead, the court awarded them $894,443 in fees (the amount Denver proposed) and $97,494.99 in expenses.
Plaintiffs now appeal from the district court’s decision on fees and expenses. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. Code, section 1291, the appellate court reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Quintana v. Hansen
Celestino Quintana, a state prisoner, had filed an instant habeas petition, alleging that: that the prosecution violated his due-process rights by failing to honor an agreement not to file habitual-criminal charges if he waived his right to a preliminary hearing; (2) that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by performing protective sweep of his home during his arrest, requiring suppression of all evidence obtained from that search; and (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel didn’t ensure that mental-health professionals evaluated his competency over a 30-day period.
Quinatana sought a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S. Code, section 2253(c)(1) to challenge the denial of his section 2254 habeas petition and moved to proceed in forma pauperis. The 10th Circuit denied the request for a COA and denied the IFP motion.
Packard v. Goodrich
Curtis Packard was indicted in December 2010 on multiple counts of theft and securities fraud. After two private attorneys withdrew, he applied for a public defender. After entering his appearance, the public defender moved to withdraw, stating that Packard’s application was incomplete and that he had failed, despite repeated requests, to provide the necessary financial documentation.
Packard continued to appear pro se at subsequent hearings, while the court continued to inquire about the possibility of appointing counsel for him. The trial court ultimately expressed concern that, by his conduct, Packard was effectively waiving his right to counsel. It inquired about his understanding of his right to counsel and the charges against him. He remained pro se throughout the trial and at his sentencing.
At trial, the jury convicted Packard on all counts. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Packard’s conviction. It agreed with the trial judge that “Packard waived his right to counsel because the court gave him two years to retain private counsel and numerous opportunities to fill out an application proving indigency. He did neither.”
Packard, sought to appeal the district court’s denial of his application for relief under 28 U.S. Code, section 2254, which asserted violations of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the representation of counsel and to confront a witness at trial. The 10th Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal.
Raup v. Vail Summit Resorts
Carolyn Raup was badly injured upon dismounting a chairlift operated by Vail Summit Resorts, Inc. She sued Vail in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under diversity jurisdiction, asserting a negligence claim and a claim under Colorado’s Premises Liability Act.
The district court dismissed the negligence claim as preempted by the PLA and granted summary judgment to Vail on the PLA claim as barred by a waiver on the lift ticket.
Raup appealed only the dismissal of the PLA claim, asserting that the waiver was unenforceable. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. Code, section 1291, the 10th Circuit affirmed. Under Colorado’s common-law test for waiver enforceability, the release was “fairly entered into” and “expressed in clear and unambiguous language.” And the PLA does not preempt the common-law defense.
Mallet v. U.S.
In 2003, Dawane Arthur Mallett “was convicted of two counts of aiding and abetting interference with commerce by robbery, two counts of use of a firearm, one count of aiding and abetting armed bank burglary and kidnapping and one count of aiding and abetting carjacking a vehicle that has been transported in interstate commerce. He was sentenced to 654 months in federal prison.
Mallett eventually filed a petition in district court asserting a right to be immediately released and deported to the United Kingdom. In support of his asserted entitlement to immediate release, Mallett claimed that as a “Moorish American,” he had a “divine inherent birthright to ex-patriate and re-patriate at any time.” Attached to Mallett’s petition was an “Oath of Office Appointment Affidavit,” with a signature on the part of Mallett described as “Signature of Major President United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,” and the purported signature of “Queen Elisebeth [sic], Queen of England.”
The district court concluded Mallett’s allegations were “delusional and factually frivolous” and that his claim rested on “an indisputedly meritless legal theory.” The district court’s conclusion that Mallett’s petition is frivolous is indisputably correct, and Mallett’s flimsy appellate arguments to the contrary are utterly frivolous.
Accordingly, for exactly those reasons set out by the districtcourt, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order of dismissal. Because Mallett has failed to make a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on appeal, the court also denied his motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and ordered him to remit the full appellate filing fee forthwith.