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C.H. sought to seal the records of two offenses from more than a decade earlier — one resulting in a misdemeanor conviction for harassment and the other resulting in a deferred judgment for trespass that was later dismissed. Without directly addressing the trespass deferred judgment, the trial court concluded that the harassment conviction involved domestic violence and therefore was ineligible for sealing.
C.H. appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to seal her criminal records in this case.
The appeals court agreed with the trial court that the conviction involved domestic violence and, thus, fell within the exclusion in Colorado Revised Statute 24-72-706(2)(a)(VI)(E). But at that point, the appeals court noted the lower court should’ve applied section 24-72-706(2)(b), which allows the records of otherwise-excluded misdemeanor offenses to be sealed if the court finds that the requisite criteria have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
The appeals court also concluded, interpreting other sections of the sealing statutes, that the records of C.H.’s trespass deferred judgment are not eligible for sealing but that the existence of the deferred judgment doesn’t prevent the records of the harassment conviction from potentially being sealed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order to the extent that it denied the request to seal records of the trespass deferred judgment. They reversed the order to the extent that it denied the request to seal records of the harassment conviction, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider and make findings on the request to seal the records of the harassment conviction under the standard set forth in section 24-72-706(2)(b).
In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.L.P. (psychological mother) appealed the juvenile court’s order dismissing her as a respondent concerning C.D.P. (the child). She contends the appeals court should recognize her as the child’s “psychological parent” under the Uniform Parentage Act — see CRS 19-4-101-130 or alternatively, the appeals court should reverse the court’s dismissal order and remand the case so she may be “given an opportunity to regain custody of her son and to complete a legal adoption.”
J.L.P. had physical custody of the child since his birth. The child’s biological mother agreed that J.L.P. would adopt the child, so she executed a power of attorney to J.L.P. concerning the child, leading the women to believe the adoption was complete and legal. However, no legal adoption was effectuated because adoption proceedings were not conducted.
When the child was two years old, the Adams County Human Services Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the child. The petition named J.L.P. as the child’s respondent parent and alleged the child had been exposed to domestic violence in her home.
A few weeks later, J.L.P. overdosed on methamphetamine, while the child was in her home. She survived and the child was removed from her home. The juvenile court ordered temporary legal custody with the department and physical custody with J.L.P.’s parents.
At a continued advisement hearing, J.L.P’s attorney told the court that “the adoption had never been completed.” He also said that “we know she is not the biological mother” and that she “has really no legal relationship to this child.” He advised the court that his client “wants to still be involved in this case as a psychological mother.”
The department then filed an amended petition that named J.L.P. as the respondent custodian and included biological mother and biological father as respondent parents.
At a later hearing, J.L.P. entered a no-fault admission to the petition and the court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected as to her.
The juvenile court also adjudicated the child dependent and neglected as to the biological mother and biological father based on abandonment.
After the juvenile court terminated biological mother’s parental rights, the court continued physical custody of the child with the psychological grandparents. The juvenile court found that the child’s “continued out-of-home placement is necessary and appropriate and in his best interest. His permanency goal is adoption by nonrelatives.” The court did not immediately dismiss J.L.P. from the case; rather, the court and parties agreed to have her continue to work on her treatment plan with the goal that she would become sober and ultimately adopt the child.
The parties held a post-termination review hearing a few months later. At this hearing, the department and guardian ad litem requested J.L.P. be dismissed from the case due to her noncompliance with her treatment plan. The juvenile court agreed and dismissed her from the case, finding that she had no legal rights to the child because she was not the child’s “legal parent,” and, based on her noncompliance with treatment, she would not be approved as an adoptive parent.
J.L.P. filed a motion to reconsider the court’s order, in which, for the first time, she pointed out that “[p]sychological mothers can be made legal mothers.” The juvenile court denied this motion in a written order.
On appeal, J.L.P. contended the appeals court should recognize her as the child’s “psychological parent” under the UPA because she “was the child’s only parent and his psychological mother” and she “meets the legal definition of a natural parent pursuant to Title 19.” The appeals court disagreed.
The appeals court affirmed the juvenile court’s order. Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Sueanna Johnson specially concurred.
Three other opinions were also decided by the Colorado Court of Appeals Sept. 28. Click here to read them.