People v. Fortson
A jury found Ricardo Fortson guilty of one count of sexual assault on a child based on alleged sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl and one count of sexual assault on a child as a part of a pattern of abuse.
Fortson contended on appeal that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct throughout the trial by eliciting and referencing two categories of other uncharged sexual acts as propensity evidence: sexual acts Fortson allegedly committed on other children and sexual acts Fortson allegedly committed against the 14-year-old girl prior to the two charged incidents. At trial, the defense counsel failed to object to all but one instance of misconduct.
The central issue on appeal was whether the pervasive misconduct infected the jury’s consideration of the evidence that the court could not deem the guilty verdict reliable.
The Court of Appeals concluded that it did and therefore, reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial.
People v. Short
A division of the Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s exculpatory statement to the police admissible under the rule of completeness is not subject to impeachment under Colorado Rule of Evidence 806. Accordingly, the division determined that it was error, albeit harmless, for the trial court to conclude that the defendant’s statement, if admitted, was subject to impeachment under CRE 806.
The division also rejected the defendant’s contention that reversal was required because three witnesses improperly bolstered the credibility of the victim. Finally, the division agreed that the trial court incorrectly entered separate convictions for sexual assault on a child and sexual assault on a child-pattern of abuse. Because the division determined that the pattern of abuse count acts only as a sentence enhancer, one count had to be vacated.
People v. Henry
After a crime victim compensation board makes a payment to a victim, it might ask a court to order the defendant in the victim’s case to pay restitution to the board. One of Colorado’s restitution statutes, section 18-1.3-603(10)(a) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, guides a trial court’s decision when addressing a compensation board’s request for restitution.
In this case, the trial court, relying on section 18-1.3-603(10)(a)’s presumption, ordered Anthony Henry to pay restitution to a compensation board. He appealed and asserted that the evidence was not sufficient to support the compensation board’s restitution request. The Court of Appeals disagreed because the trial court properly relied on the statutory presumption and that defendant did not provide any evidence to rebut it. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed.
Preferred Professional Insurance Company v. The Doctors Company
Suppose that an injured party sues a person who has both primary and excess insurance covering the claim. The injured party offers to settle for an amount within the primary coverage limit. The primary insurer exercises its contractual, discretionary right not to accept the settlement. But the excess insurer, perhaps spooked by the prospect of a judgment exceeding the primary coverage limit, pays the settlement demanded by the injured party. When the excess insurer sues the primary insurer to recover the amount paid in settlement, claiming that the primary insurer should have accepted the settlement offer, what sort of claim may the excess insurer assert? And must the excess insurer plead and prove that the primary insurer acted in bad faith in declining to settle?
The facts of this case match those of the hypothetical. Preferred Professional Insurance Company was the excess insurer that paid the settlement. The Doctors Company was the primary insurer that declined to settle. But while Preferred Professional Insurance Company purported to bring a claim of equitable subrogation against The Doctors Company, it disavowed any intent to proceed on the legal theory that it stands in the insured’s shoes. It did not plead or attempt to show that The Doctors Company acted in bad faith. Instead, Preferred Professional Insurance Company’s theory was that general equitable principles allowed it to recover from The Doctor’s Company apart from any rights of the insured under his contract with The Doctors Company, and that it need not plead or prove that The Doctors Company acted in bad faith.
The district court accepted Preferred Professional Insurance Company’s theory and granted summary judgment in its favor. But the Court of Appeals concluded that Preferred Professional Insurance Company’s theory of recovery was not viable under Colorado law. So the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment in The Doctor Company’s favor.
People in Interest of C.Y.
In this dependency and neglect proceeding, the mother appealed the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationships with the children. The mother contended, among other things, that the juvenile judge erred by not recusing herself from the termination proceeding because the judge had previously served as a guardian ad litem on a different case involving the mother’s older child. Because the Court of Appeals agreed that under the circumstances of this case the judge abused her discretion by not recusing herself from the proceeding, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new termination hearing.
10th Circuit Court of Appeals
A.P v. Lewis Palmer School District
Appellant LT brought suit against Lewis Palmer School District under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, as well as under state law. He alleged the school district failed to halt disability-related bullying that left him with depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and educational injuries. He also alleged the school district wrongfully expelled him, blaming him for altercations stemming from the bullying. The district court dismissed LT’s federal claims on the grounds that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. LT did not exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act required procedures and forfeited the other arguments he advanced on appeal.
United States of America v. Edward Wing
Through a 28 U.S. Code section 2255 motion, Edward Wing contested his sentence stemming from a 2006 conviction for discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S. Code section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The offense of assaulting a federal law enforcement officer with a deadly or dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S. Code section 111, served as the crime of violence underlying Wing’s section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) conviction. The district court denied habeas relief but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Wing’s “sentence was unconstitutionally enhanced by holding that his conviction under 18 U.S. Code section 111 constituted a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S. Code section 924(c)(3)(A).” Pending before the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, Wing’s unopposed motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include a challenge to the constitutionality of his section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) conviction. On appeal, Wing argued that his section 111(b) offense no longer qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of section 924(c).
While the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals granted Wing’s unopposed motion to expand the certificate of appealability, two independent reasons caused the court to affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
First, Wing’s habeas motion was untimely under 28 U.S. Code section 2255(f). Second, consistent with recent precedent, a section 111 offense qualified as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A).
United States v. Carr
Heather Carr accepted a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to claims, in violation of 18 U.S. Code section 286. She was sentenced to 57 months of imprisonment. Although the plea agreement contained an appeal waiver, Carr appealed. The government moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn.
Under Hahn, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals considered “whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights, whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights and whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
In her response to the government’s motion, Carr, through counsel, conceded that her appeal waiver was enforceable as to the direct appeal, and she did not contest any of the Hahn factors. Accordingly, the motion to enforce was granted, and the matter was terminated.
Brooks v. Archuleta
Proceeding pro se, Jason Brooks sought a certificate of appealability from the court so he could appeal the district court’s denial of the motion he filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brooks also sought authorization to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
The matter before the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals began on April 20, 2016, when Brooks filed an application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S. Code section 2254 in federal district court. The district court dismissed the habeas petition on July 26, 2016, concluding the claim raised by Brooks was unexhausted and procedurally barred.
In March 2017, Brooks’s request for a COA was denied by the court and his appeal was dismissed. Brooks returned to the district court and filed a motion seeking relief from that court’s July 2016 judgment. The motion was denied by the district court and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals denied Brooks’s request for a COA.
Brooks filed a second Rule 60(b)(6) motion in district court on December 11, 2017.
In this motion, he argued the federal claim raised in his section 2254 petition was exhausted because the substance of the claim was presented to the Colorado Court of Appeals in state post-conviction proceedings he initiated on March 7, 2016. The district court disagreed, concluding the state post-conviction proceedings referenced by Brooks were not completed until nearly a year after Brooks’s section 2254 petition was dismissed. Accordingly, the district court denied Brooks’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
Because Brooks had not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” he was not entitled to a COA. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals denied Brooks’s request for a COA and dismissed the appeal.